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Sleep has been shown to facilitate the consolidation of prospective memory, which
is the ability to execute intended actions at the appropriate time in the future. In a
previous study, the sleep benefit for prospective memory was mainly expressed as a
preservation of prospective memory performance under divided attention as compared
to full attention. Based on evidence that intentions are only remembered as long as
they have not been executed yet (cf. ‘Zeigarnik effect’), here we asked whether the
enhancement of prospective memory by sleep vanishes if the intention is completed
before sleep and whether completed intentions can be reinstated to benefit from sleep
again. In Experiment 1, subjects learned cue-associate word pairs in the evening and
were prospectively instructed to detect the cue words and to type in the associates
in a lexical decision task (serving as ongoing task) 2 h later before a night of sleep or
wakefulness. At a second surprise test 2 days later, sleep and wake subjects did not
differ in prospective memory performance. Specifically, both sleep and wake groups
detected fewer cue words under divided compared to full attention, indicating that
sleep does not facilitate the consolidation of completed intentions. Unexpectedly, in
Experiment 2, reinstating the intention, by instructing subjects about the second test
after completion of the first test, was not sufficient to restore the sleep benefit. However,
in Experiment 3, where subjects were instructed about both test sessions immediately
after learning, sleep facilitated prospective memory performance at the second test after
2 days, evidenced by comparable cue word detection under divided attention and full
attention in sleep participants, whereas wake participants detected fewer cue words
under divided relative to full attention. Together, these findings show that for prospective
memory to benefit from sleep, (i) the intention has to be active across the sleep period,
and (ii) the intention should be induced in temporal proximity to the initial learning
session.
Keywords: prospective memory, sleep, memory consolidation, future relevance, intention completion, intention
reinstatement
INTRODUCTION
Sleep facilitates the consolidation and subsequent recall of newly encoded memories (Paller and
Voss, 2004; Stickgold, 2005; Diekelmann and Born, 2010; Rasch and Born, 2013). Memories that are
relevant for future behavior benefit particularly from sleep. Emotional information, for example, is
retained better across sleep compared to wake periods than neutral information, with some studies
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even reporting an additional memory boost for emotional
content after sleep at the expense of reduced memory for neutral
contents (Payne et al., 2008, 2012, Payne and Kensinger, 2010,
2011). Others found that sleep improves memory consolidation
only when subjects expect to be tested on the learned material
after sleep, whereas no sleep benefit is evident for memories
that are not expected to be tested again (Wilhelm et al., 2011;
Van Dongen et al., 2012). When manipulating the relevance of
memories by announcing a reward for good performance at
testing after sleep, subjects show better performance for a task for
which they expected to be rewarded than for a task for which they
did not expect any reward, with this difference being only evident
after sleep but not after an equivalent interval of wakefulness
(Fischer and Born, 2009).
These findings suggest that sleep facilitates memory
consolidation selectively if the memory content is regarded
as important for the individual and as potentially useful for
future actions. Prospective memory is the type of memory that is
inherently future-directed, being defined as the ability to execute
an intended action at the appropriate time in the future (Ellis,
1996). Scullin and McDaniel (2010) were the first to demonstrate
that delayed event-based prospective memory, i.e., the ability
to perform an intended action upon detection of a prospective
memory cue after a longer time interval, is improved by a period
of sleep during the retention interval. In this study, subjects were
asked to detect two different cue words, each presented once
in three different ongoing tasks after an interval of 12 h either
filled with sleep or wakefulness. After the sleep interval, subjects
detected the cue words more efficiently compared to the wake
period, suggesting that sleep facilitated prospective memory cue
detection. In another study by Diekelmann et al. (2013b), using a
more naturalistic prospective memory task, subjects were told a
cover story, in which they were asked to pay attention that at the
test session 2 days later, a vigilance task that they were required
to perform was presented in a specific color, which was allegedly
a sign for the correct version of the task. Subjects were told that
sometimes the experimenter can make a ‘mistake’ and start the
wrong task version and in this case, subjects should immediately
report the mistake. For subjects who were allowed to sleep after
this instruction, the probability to detect the experimenter’s
‘mistake’ at testing was twice as high as for subjects who had
stayed awake after formation of the intention (Diekelmann
et al., 2013b). A second experiment of this study tested whether
the beneficial effect of sleep depended on a specific sleep stage.
Higher probabilities to detect the ‘mistake’ were seen after an
early slow wave sleep (SWS)-rich sleep period but not after a late
rapid eye movement (REM) sleep-rich period, indicating that the
beneficial effect of sleep for prospective memory performance is
dependent on SWS rather than REM sleep (Diekelmann et al.,
2013b). To the best of our knowledge, this is the only study to
date examining the role of single sleep stages for prospective
memory, and thus, these findings will have to be confirmed in
future studies.
Recent evidence further suggests that sleep supports
different aspects and processes of prospective remembering
(Diekelmann et al., 2013a). Prospective memory includes two
sub-components: the ability to remember that something has
to be done (the prospective component or intent), and the
ability to remember what has to be done (the retrospective
component or content) (Einstein and McDaniel, 1990, 1996;
Kliegel et al., 2008). Moreover, prospective remembering
can be accomplished applying either resource-dependent
environmental monitoring strategies or automatic spontaneous
retrieval processes (McDaniel and Einstein, 2000). According to
the monitoring account, attentional resources are needed to keep
the intention actively in mind and to search the environment
for cues that indicate the correct time and place to execute the
intention (Smith, 2003; Smith and Bayen, 2004). Spontaneous
retrieval, on the other hand, can occur when the association
between the cue and the intended action is strong enough such
that the encounter of a cue in the environment automatically
brings to mind the associated intention (McDaniel et al., 2004).
The ‘dynamic multiprocess framework’ suggests that monitoring
and spontaneous retrieval processes interact dynamically to
support successful prospective remembering, with one or the
other process prevailing depending on the individual, the context
and the task demands (Gilbert et al., 2013; Scullin et al., 2013).
A study by Diekelmann et al. (2013a) indicated that sleep after
the instruction of an intention improves both the prospective
component and the retrospective component of prospective
memory and facilitates the use of spontaneous associative
retrieval processes to retrieve the intention. In this study, subjects
learned 20 cue words, each of which was linked to a specific
associated word. After a delay of 2 days, which was filled
with a night of sleep or wakefulness and a second (recovery)
night of sleep, subjects had to detect the cue words during a
lexical decision task, serving as ongoing task, and to type in
the associated word upon detecting a cue word. After sleep
compared to wakefulness, subjects were more likely to execute
the intention, by detecting at least one cue word. Sleep subjects
also detected more cue words than wake subjects (prospective
component) and remembered more associated words upon cue
detection (retrospective component). Interestingly, higher cue
detection in sleep subjects was only observed under divided
attention conditions when attentional resources were reduced,
suggesting that after sleep, subjects were able to rely to a
larger extent on spontaneous retrieval processes rather than
on attentional monitoring. These findings indicate that sleep
strengthens the intentional memory trace and particularly
the association between the cue and the associated intention
allowing for the automatic activation of the intention upon cue
detection.
Building on these findings and based on evidence that sleep
preferentially benefits memories that are relevant for future
behavior, here we asked whether sleep facilitates intentions only
as long as they are active across the retention interval, with
the sleep effect vanishing once the intended actions have been
completed. In everyday life, it is highly functional to forget
or even actively inhibit intentions upon their completion in
order to free resources for new plans and intentions as well as
to prevent commission errors, i.e., the erroneous execution of
intentions that were already executed (Scullin et al., 2012; Walser
et al., 2012; Pink and Dodson, 2013; Scullin and Bugg, 2013).
For example, inadvertently taking certain medication twice can
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be highly dangerous for the individual. Once an intention has
been realized, the memory for the intended action vanishes, an
effect known as the Zeigarnik effect (Zeigarnik, 1927; Mäntylä
and Sgaramella, 1997). Upon completion of an intention, the
monitoring of the environment for cues that are associated
with the intended action, is discontinued (Scullin et al., 2009;
Beck et al., 2014), which is associated with the deactivation of
brain areas that are engaged in monitoring processes during the
active phase of the intention (Beck et al., 2014). Whether the
reported effect of sleep on prospective memory is abolished once
an intention has been completed is currently unknown. It also
remains an open question, whether intentions can be reinstated
for sleep-dependent consolidation after their completion. We
hypothesized that intentions do no longer benefit from sleep
when they are completed before the sleep interval and are thus
no longer relevant for future behavior. Additionally, we expected
completed intentions to benefit from sleep again when they are
reinstated after completion, making them again relevant for later
testing. To test these questions, we performed three consecutive
experiments, all of which were based on our previously published
findings described above (Diekelmann et al., 2013a; from now on
called “Basic experiment”).
EXPERIMENT 1: INTENTION
COMPLETED
Our Basic experiment (Diekelmann et al., 2013a) established
that sleep facilitates the ability to execute an intended action at
the appropriate time after a delay of 2 days (see Figure 1A for
the experimental design). Most interestingly, subjects who were
allowed to sleep after intention formation detected more cues
in the ongoing task at the delayed test session specifically under
divided attention conditions. Sleep and wake subjects performed
equally well in cue detection when they had full attentional
resources available. With reduced attentional resources, however,
cue detection was markedly impaired in wake subjects but
remained completely unaffected in sleep subjects (see Figure 2A),
suggesting that sleep strengthened the cue-intention association
thereby favoring spontaneous retrieval processes. However, from
these data it remains unclear whether the sleep effect is specific
for the memories associated with the intention or whether sleep
simply non-selectively strengthens memories in the associative
network that were encoded shortly before sleep. Here we
manipulated the intentional status of the memories by having the
intended action completed before the sleep interval. Specifically,
we asked whether the beneficial effect of sleep vanishes when
the intended behavior is completed before sleep and thus, the
intention is no longer relevant.
Subjects performed on the same task with the same instruction
as in the Basic experiment (Diekelmann et al., 2013a) (Figure 3).
However, a first test session took place in the evening 2 h after
instruction of the prospective memory task, before one group
of subjects went to sleep (n = 18) whereas the other stayed
awake the following night (n = 15; Figure 1B). During the first
test session, subjects already completed the intention. To ensure
that the intention was no longer active during subsequent sleep,
participants were told immediately after this test session that they
would not have to do this task again. Nevertheless, a second test
session occurred unexpected to the subjects 2 days later, like in
FIGURE 1 | Experimental design. (A) In our Basic experiment (Diekelmann et al., 2013a), learning (L) and instruction of the intention (I) took place in the evening
(∼22.00 h), before a night of sleep (sleep group) or wakefulness (wake group). Subjects were instructed that they would be tested (T) on their prospective memory
2 days later after an additional night of (recovery) sleep. (B) In Experiment 1 (Intention completed), learning took place at ∼20.00 h. Thereafter, participants were
instructed that they would be tested on their prospective memory 2 h later (T1). Following a night of sleep or wakefulness and another recovery night, a second
surprise test took place in the morning (T2). (C) In Experiment 2 (Intention reinstated), participants learned and were instructed for the first prospective memory test
(T1) 2 h later, like in Experiment 1. After the first test, the intention was reinstated (RI) by instructing subjects that they would be tested on their prospective memory
again 2 days later (T2). (D) In Experiment 3 (Intention active throughout), learning took place like in Experiments 1 and 2. After learning, subjects were instructed that
they would be tested on their prospective memory twice, once in 2 h (T1) and a second time 2 days later (T2). Following the first test, subjects received a reminder
instruction (RI) for the second test. Arrows indicate which test session(s) the different instructions are directed at.
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FIGURE 2 | Effects of sleep on prospective memory. (A) In our Basic experiment (Diekelmann et al., 2013a), sleep participants detected a comparable number
of cues under full attention and under divided attention conditions, whereas wake participants were markedly impaired in cue detection under divided attention.
(B) With the intention completed before sleep in Experiment 1, both sleep and wake subjects showed impaired prospective memory performance, i.e., diminished
numbers of cues detected, under divided attention. (C) Reinstatement of the intention after its completion in Experiment 2 did not suffice to reinstate the sleep
benefit. Both sleep and wake subjects were impaired in cue detection under divided attention. (D) When the intention was active throughout the entire experimental
period in Experiment 3, i.e., when subjects expected both test sessions from the beginning, sleep benefitted prospective memory despite the first completion of the
intention before sleep. While wake subjects detected less cues under divided attention compared to full attention, sleep subjects were not impaired by divided
attention. Means ± SEM are shown. ∗p < 0.05.
the Basic experiment. Based on evidence indicating that sleep
selectively strengthens memories of relevance for future behavior
(Fischer and Born, 2009; Wilhelm et al., 2011), we hypothesized
that the improving effect of sleep on prospective memory would
disappear when the intended behavior is completed before sleep.
Specifically, sleep should no longer facilitate the storage of the
cue-intention association, thus, both sleep and wake subjects
would be expected to rely to a larger extent on monitoring
processes and should therefore to the same extent be impaired
in cue detection under divided attention.
Methods
Participants
A total of 33 subjects (19 females, mean age [±SD]: 21.94± 2.97),
with regular sleep-wake cycles (≥ 6 h sleep per night) and
no shift work for at least 6 weeks prior to the experiments
participated in Experiment 1. Subjects reported no history of
any neurological, psychiatric or endocrine disorder and did not
take any medication at the time of the experiments. Ingestion of
caffeine and alcohol was not allowed from the day before until
the end of the experiments and subjects were instructed to stay
awake during the day after the sleep/wake night. Prior to the
experimental night, subjects spent one adaptation night in the
sleep laboratory. All subjects gave written informed consent and
were paid for participation. The study was approved by the local
ethics committee of the University of Lübeck.
Design and Procedure
All subjects reported to the laboratory at 19:30 h, filled in
questionnaires, underwent the initial learning session at
20:00–20:45 h and received the prospective memory instruction
thereafter (Figure 1B). Subjects then watched a non-disturbing
movie until they were informed about whether they were
assigned to the sleep or the wake group. In the sleep condition,
electrodes were attached for standard polysomnographic
recordings, including electroencephalogram (at sites C3 and
C4), electrooculogram and electromyogram. Polysomnographic
recordings were visually scored oﬄine according to standard
criteria (Rechtschaffen and Kales, 1986). The first test session
took place between 22:00 and 22:30 h. In the sleep condition,
subjects then went to bed for regular sleep between 23:00 and
07:00 h, whereas subjects in the wake condition stayed awake
throughout the night, spending the time with reading, watching
TV or playing simple games. Subjects in both conditions left the
laboratory the next morning. After spending the day awake and
another night of sleep at home, allowing the subjects in the wake
condition to recover from their initial sleep loss, they returned to
the laboratory for the second test session at 10:00 h the following
day. Subjects kept record of their activities and their bedtime and
wake-up time for the night of sleep at home.
Prospective Memory Task
The same prospective memory task as in our Basic experiment
(Diekelmann et al., 2013a) was applied. Participants were
required to detect cues (i.e., specific cue words) and perform
associated actions (i.e., recall associated second words) in an
ongoing task (i.e., lexical decision task; Figure 3). In the initial
learning session, subjects first practiced the lexical decision task
(serving as ongoing task later) without any prospective memory
cues. Subjects were presented in a random sequence with 100
word stimuli, half of which were existing German words. The
other half were ‘non-words’ which were derived from German
words by substituting one consonant (Marsh et al., 2002, 2003).
Subjects were instructed to press as fast and as accurately as
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FIGURE 3 | Prospective memory task. In all experiments, subjects took part in a learning session, during which they practiced on the lexical decision task and
learned 20 cue-associate word pairs. The instruction of prospective memory (I) differed for the different experiments. In Experiment 1 (Intention completed), subjects
were instructed that at a test session in 2 h (Test 1), some of the 20 cue words could occur within the lexical decision task and if they recognized a cue word they
should press the ‘space’ bar and type in the respective associated word. Subjects were explicitly told that they need to memorize this instruction because the
experimenter would not remind them of what to do at the test session. After Test 1, subjects did not receive another reinstruction (RI) but Test 2 took place 2 days
later as a surprise test. Test 2 was identical to Test 1, except that in order to manipulate available attentional resources, subjects performed a secondary task in
parallel (monitoring spoken digits for two consecutive even digits) either during the first or second half of the lexical decision task. In Experiment 2 (Intention
reinstated), participants followed the same protocol as in Experiment 1 (Intention completed), with the only difference that after Test 1, subjects received a
reinstruction of the intention (RI) in which they were told that they would have to perform on the task again in a second test session 2 days later (Test 2). In
Experiment 3 (Intention active throughout), the protocol was identical to that of Experiment 2 (Intention reinstated), with the only exception that during the initial
instruction (I), subjects were told that they would have to perform on the task twice, in test session 1 after 2 h and in test session 2 after 2 days. Like in Experiment 2
(Intention reinstated), they received an additional reinstruction (RI) for Test 2 after completion of Test 1. In our Basic experiment (Diekelmann et al., 2013a),
participants were tested for their prospective memory only once after 2 days (Test 2), with this test being instructed (I) immediately after the learning session.
possible the right key (on a keyboard) for correct words and
the left key for non-words (with the respective index finger).
After practice on the lexical decision task, subjects learned 20
cue-associate word pairs for the subsequent prospective memory
task. Half of the word pairs were semantically related, e.g.,
Genie – Bottle, and half were not semantically related, e.g.,
Season – Master (however, since semantic relatedness did not
affect memory measures differentially for the sleep and wake
group, related and unrelated word pairs were combined in all
analyses). Subjects learned the cue words first separately from
the associated words. Cue words were presented successively
for 5 s each with 1-s breaks in between. After presentation of
all cue words, subjects recalled the words in a free recall test.
Presentation and free recall was repeated to a criterion of 90%
(i.e., 18) correctly recalled cue words to ensure that all subjects
would perfectly recognize the cue words in a recognition test and
prospective memory retrieval would not depend on how well cue
words had been learned (see also Diekelmann et al., 2013a). The
90% criterion in the free recall test was chosen based on pilot
studies indicating that this criterion produced practically perfect
performance on the word recognition test. After learning of cue
words, subjects learned the respective associated words for each
cue word. Word pairs were presented successively for 5 s each
with a 1-s break in between. For each word pair, the cue word
was presented on the left side of the screen and the associated
word on the right side of the screen. After all word pairs had
been presented once, a cued recall test followed in which subjects
upon presentation of each cue word were required to press first
the ‘space’ bar, then a field opened on the screen where they
should type in the corresponding associated word. After pressing
‘enter,’ the next cue word appeared without feedback about the
correctness of the previous response. If subjects did not achieve
the criterion of 60% (i.e., 12) correctly recalled associated words,
all word pairs were presented again for re-learning, followed
by another cued recall test. Presentation of the word pairs and
cued recall was repeated until subjects met the 60% learning
criterion. The 60% criterion was chosen based on previous studies
indicating maximal effects of sleep on consolidation of word pair
memories at this criterion (Drosopoulos et al., 2007).
The prospective memory instruction was given after the
learning phase. Subjects were informed that, apart from testing
their lexical discrimination abilities, we were also interested in
their ability to remember to do something in the future. For this
purpose, some of the cue words they had just learned would
occasionally appear within the lexical decision task when they
would be tested again. Subjects were instructed that the test would
take place 2 h later that same evening. They were instructed that
when they detected a cue word within the lexical decision task at
this test they should press the ‘space’ bar and then a field would
open where they should type in the associated word, confirm
with ‘enter’ and continue with the lexical decision task. Subjects
had to repeat this instruction in their own words to ensure full
understanding. They were explicitly instructed to memorize this
instruction because at the test session the experimenter would not
remind them of what to do.
In the test session 2 h later, subjects performed the lexical
decision task without being reminded of the instructed intention.
The lexical decision task during testing contained 390 word
stimuli, i.e., 185 real words, 185 non-words, and the 20
learned cue words. Cue words were presented every 16th to
20th word (mean: 18th). A break was made after half of the
words had been presented. After this first test session subjects
were told that during the second test session after 2 days
they would have to perform on completely different tasks for
another part of the study. Thus, they would not have to do
the prospective memory task again. The second test session,
however, was basically identical to the first test session. Yet,
subjects were explicitly instructed in the second test session
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to detect the cue words and type in the associated words,
as they did not expect another test of the previous task.
Note that this procedure in fact corresponds to the standard
assessment of prospective memory where subjects are explicitly
instructed before testing and prospective memory performance
is quantified by the subject’s ability to detect cues during a
distracting ongoing task. In order to test whether subjects used a
relatively resource-demanding monitoring strategy or a relatively
resource-independent spontaneous-associative retrieval strategy,
we directly manipulated available attentional resources during
the second test session: during one of the halves of the task
(balanced across subjects) the subjects performed in parallel an
auditory attention task in which spoken digits were presented
via loudspeakers at a rate of one digit every 2 s. The subjects
were required to press a separate key whenever two even digits
occurred consecutively.
Control Tasks
In the end of the two test sessions, i.e., after the first test
in the evening as well as after the second test 2 days later,
memory for the cue words was tested in a recognition test.
The 20 cue words were presented randomly mixed with 40
distractor words (not presented before) and subjects had to
indicate for each word if it was a cue word or new. Additionally,
memory for the associated words was tested in a cued recall.
Each cue word was presented on the screen and subjects had to
recall the respective associated word. No feedback was given on
whether or not their response was correct. To control for general
alertness and vigilance, all subjects performed on a vigilance
task for the duration of 5 min before learning and after the
two test sessions. In this task, a dot randomly appeared at
the left or right side of a computer screen every 2–10 s and
participants had to respond as quickly as possible by pressing
the corresponding left or right button. Because vigilance data
were missing for two subjects in the wake group and from
one subject in the sleep group, the available sample size added
up to n = 17 (sleep group) and n = 13 (wake group) for
the analyses of this task. Subjects also rated their subjective
sleepiness on the Stanford Sleepiness Scale before learning and
after the test sessions, ranging from 1 (“feeling active, vital,
alert, or wide awake”) to 7 (“no longer fighting sleep, sleep
onset soon; having dream-like thoughts”) (Hoddes et al., 1973).
Furthermore, after the second test session, all subjects completed
a questionnaire to assess rehearsal of the prospective memory
instruction and rehearsal of the cue-associate pairs during the
retention interval as well as the use of strategies to remember the
instruction and the cue-associates. For the final cue recognition
test and the cued recall of the associated words, one data set
of the wake group was missing, thus analyses included n = 14
participants in the wake group and n = 18 participants in the
sleep group.
Statistical Analysis
All variables were analyzed using analyses of variance (ANOVA)
and post hoc t-tests. Additionally, non-parametric post hoc tests
(i.e., Mann–Whitney U Test and Wilcoxon-Test) were used
when deviations from the normal distribution occurred. Level of
significance was set to p = 0.05. Greenhouse–Geisser correction
for degrees of freedom was applied where appropriate.
Results
Prospective Memory Task Performance
With the intention completed before sleep, sleep did no longer
improve the prospective component of prospective memory at
testing after 2 days. At the second test session, subjects in the
sleep group detected 91.11± 1.96% of the cue words without the
secondary task and 80.00 ± 4.64% with the secondary task to be
performed in parallel (z= 2.55, p= 0.01, d= 0.76). Wake subjects
detected 86.67 ± 3.47% and 78.67 ± 4.87% (z = 2.39, p = 0.02,
d = 0.51) of the cue words without and with the secondary
task, respectively (main effect ‘with/without secondary task’:
F(1,31) = 14.00, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.31; main effect ‘sleep/wake’:
F(1,31) = 0.35, p = 0.56; ‘sleep/wake’ × ‘with/without secondary
task’ interaction: F(1,31) = 0.37, p = 0.55; Figure 2B). Thus
as expected, divided attention by the secondary task during the
second test session impaired cue detection in the sleep group to
the same extent as in the wake group.
Completing the intention before sleep also prevented the
beneficial effect of sleep on the retrospective component of
prospective memory observed in the Basic experiment (see
Supplementary Figure 1A). Relative to the number of cues
detected, sleep subjects remembered 63.90 ± 3.89% of the
associated words and wake subjects remembered 68.51 ± 4.26%,
F(1,31) = 0.64, p = 0.43 (for main effect ‘sleep/wake,’
Supplementary Figure 1B) at the second test, which was
independent of attentional resources available, F(1,31) = 0.01,
p = 0.92, for the interaction ‘sleep/wake’ × ‘with/without
secondary task’; F(1,31) = 0.46, p = 0.50, for main effect
‘with/without secondary task.’
Initial learning performance of cue words and associated
words was comparable between the sleep and wake group.
Subjects in the sleep and wake group remembered 19.00 ± 0.20
and 18.73 ± 0.18 cue words in the criterion learning trial,
U = 111.00, z = −0.93, p = 0.38, and needed on average
2.33 ± 0.20 and 2.33 ± 0.19 trials to reach the criterion,
U = 131.50, z = −0.14, p = 0.92. Recall of associated words
was 15.83 ± 0.54 and 15.67 ± 0.60 in the criterion learning trial,
t(31)= 0.21, p= 0.84, with a mean of 1.22± 0.13 and 1.13± 0.09
learning trials, U = 129.50, z = −0.32, p = 0.86, in the sleep and
wake group, respectively. Likewise, performance during the first
completion of the prospective memory task in the evening was
comparable between the sleep and wake group. Sleep and wake
participants detected 84.72 ± 4.84% and 86.67 ± 2.87% of cue
words, U = 128.50, z = −0.24, p = 0.82, and they remembered
69.25 ± 3.79% and 64.90 ± 3.86% of associated words relative to
the number of correctly detected cue words, t(31)= 0.80, p= 43.
Ongoing Task Performance
Sleep and wake subjects did not differ in lexical decision task
performance at learning, at the first test in the evening and at the
second test after 2 days [Table 1; trials without the secondary
task for reaction time: main effect ‘sleep/wake’: F(1,31) = 0.00,
p = 0.97, main effect ‘learning/test1/test2’: F(1.66,51.54) = 5.75,
p = 0.008, interaction ‘sleep/wake’ × ‘learning/test1/test2’:
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TABLE 1 | Ongoing task performance.
Intention completed Intention reinstated Intention active throughout
Sleep Wake Sleep Wake Sleep Wake
Reaction time
Learning 1215 ± 71 1238 ± 52 1081 ± 47 1006 ± 59 979 ± 55 1229 ± 66
Test 1 1285 ± 67 1294 ± 64 1200 ± 48 1064 ± 53 1090 ± 55 1279 ± 75
Test 2
Full attention 1159 ± 64 1119 ± 73 1109 ± 52 1021 ± 58 1016 ± 54 1222 ± 59
Divided attention 1580 ± 70 1537 ± 70 1367 ± 33 1421 ± 74 1420 ± 84 1610 ± 66
Error rate
Learning 4.83 ± 0.57 6.07 ± 1.26 4.54 ± 1.03 4.86 ± 0.86 5.80 ± 1.01 4.36 ± 0.75
Test 1 4.74 ± 0.63 3.73 ± 0.44 3.90 ± 0.72 4.45 ± 0.41 5.11 ± 0.71 4.39 ± 0.72
Test 2
Full attention 3.23 ± 0.47 5.28 ± 1.01 3.65 ± 0.60 4.33 ± 0.71 4.94 ± 1.04 3.66 ± 0.80
Divided attention 4.51 ± 0.42 6.27 ± 1.21 5.48 ± 0.77 6.30 ± 1.07 5.39 ± 0.85 5.75 ± 1.23
Reaction times (in ms) and error rates (in %) in the lexical decision task during learning, test 1, and test 2. For test 2, measures are provided separately for full attention
and divided attention. Means ± SEM are shown.
F(1.66,51.54) = 0.28, p = 0.72; for error rate: main
effect ‘sleep/wake’: F(1,31) = 0.92, p = 0.35, main effect
‘learning/test1/test2’: F(1.62,50.06) = 2.48, p = 0.11, interaction
‘sleep/wake’ × ‘learning/test1/test2’: F(1.62,50.06) = 3.19,
p = 0.06]. Sleep and wake subjects both responded significantly
faster at the second test in comparison to the learning session and
the first test in the evening [learning vs. second test: t(32)= 2.50,
p= 0.02, d= 0.25; first test vs. second test: t(32)= 3.29, p< 0.01,
d = 0.34; learning vs. first test: t(32) = −1.25, p = 0.22], while
the error rate did not change over time.
In the second test session, performing the secondary auditory
attention task in parallel slowed down reaction times for
lexical decisions in both sleep subjects and wake subjects [for
main effect ‘with/without secondary task’: F(1,31) = 198.20,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0.87, for ‘sleep/wake’ main effect: F(1,31)= 0.20,
p = 0.66, for ‘sleep/wake’ × ‘with/without secondary task’:
F(1,31) = 0.00, p = 0.97], and increased error rates [for main
effect ‘with/without secondary task’: F(1,31) = 6.89, p = 0.013,
η2p = 0.18, for main effect ‘sleep/wake’: F(1,31) = 3.37, p = 0.08,
for ‘sleep/wake’ × ‘with/without secondary task’: F(1,31) = 0.10,
p = 0.75], confirming that the secondary auditory attention task
put a high load on attentional resources.
Control Tasks
The final cue recognition test at the end of the second
test session confirmed that both sleep and wake participants
had almost perfect retrospective memory for the cue words
(recognition accuracy: sleep, 99.07± 0.34%; wake, 97.86± 0.77%;
U = 97.00, z = −1.25, p = 0.24). Moreover, sleep and
wake participants did not differ in cued recall of the
associated words [sleep: 64.44 ± 3.61%, wake: 67.86 ± 4.15%;
t(30) = −0.62, p = 0.54]. Sleep and wake subjects were
overall comparable in their performance on the vigilance task
regarding reaction time (for main effect ‘sleep/wake’ p = 0.78,
for interaction ‘sleep/wake’ × ‘learning/test1/test2’ p = 0.97,
for main effect ‘learning/test1/test2’ p < 0.01, η2p = 0.23)
and error rate (for main effect ‘sleep/wake’ p = 0.78, for
interaction ‘sleep/wake’× ‘learning/test1/test2’ p= 0.26, for main
effect ‘learning/test1/test2’ p = 0.80) as well as in subjective
sleepiness (for main effect ‘sleep/wake’ p = 0.13, for main
effect ‘learning/test1/test2’ p < 0.001, η2p = 0.44, for interaction
‘sleep/wake’ × ‘learning/test1/test2’ p = 0.21), despite generally
lower vigilance performance (all p < 0.04) and higher sleepiness
ratings at the first test in the evening (p < 0.001) for all subjects
irrespective of group (Table 2). Subjects in the sleep group also
displayed normal sleep patterns during the night following the
first test session (Table 3).
Discussion
As expected, Experiment 1 showed that a period of sleep
following an already completed intention does not improve
the ability to implement the behavior when participants are
asked to perform the prospective memory task again 2 days
later. As hypothesized, participants in both the sleep and wake
group detected significantly less cues when their attention was
reduced by a secondary auditory task compared to the full
attention condition, supporting the notion that both sleep and
wake subjects relied to a greater extent on resource-intensive
monitoring rather than spontaneous retrieval for cue detection.
We suggest that after completing the intention, with the
knowledge that the intended actions do not have to be performed
again, sleep no longer fosters the storage of the associations
between the cues and the intended actions in the associative
memory network, such that after sleep, subjects rely to a lesser
extent on automatic activation of the intention upon encounter
with the cues. These findings are consistent with the Zeigarnik
effect demonstrating that memories of uncompleted actions are
better retained than memories of already completed actions
(Zeigarnik, 1927; Mäntylä and Sgaramella, 1997). In combination
with our Basic experiment, which showed a sleep effect for
uncompleted intentions (Diekelmann et al., 2013a), these results
indicate that an intention, for profiting from sleep, needs to be
active over the sleep period and thus, needs to be relevant for
future behavior.
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TABLE 2 | Vigilance and subjective sleepiness.
Intention completed Intention reinstated Intention active throughout
Sleep Wake Sleep Wake Sleep Wake
Vigilance performance
Reaction time
Learning 348 ± 12 345 ± 10 412 ± 13 418 ± 11 420 ± 12 426 ± 9
Test 1 359 ± 13 355 ± 11 421 ± 14 446 ± 13 419 ± 12 434 ± 8
Test 2 337 ± 11 331 ± 10 406 ± 10 424 ± 11 405 ± 12 426 ± 7
Error rate
Learning 4.41 ± 0.73 4.62 ± 0.84 3.5 ± 0.64 3.93 ± 0.63 1.83 ± 0.45 2.03 ± 0.57
Test 1 3.82 ± 0.94 4.42 ± 0.58 3.5 ± 0.64 3.57 ± 0.97 2.50 ± 0.65 2.34 ± 0.66
Test 2 5.00 ± 0.91 3.46 ± 0.67 3.17 ± 0.57 3.04 ± 0.54 2.33 ± 0.86 2.50 ± 0.82
Subjective Sleepiness
Learning 2.33 ± 0.20 2.00 ± 0.20 2.93 ± 0.23 2.21 ± 0.30 2.53 ± 0.26 2.47 ± 0.15
Test 1 3.56 ± 0.25 2.87 ± 0.26 3.93 ± 0.25 5.50 ± 1.50 4.07 ± 0.25 3.29 ± 0.22
Test 2 2.11 ± 0.21 2.07 ± 0.18 2.27 ± 0.21 2.86 ± 0.29 1.93 ± 0.12 3.00 ± 0.27
Vigilance performance (reaction times in ms and error rates in % of all trials) and subjective sleepiness (Stanford Sleepiness Scale) during learning, test 1 and test 2. There
were no significant differences between respective groups in both experiments. Means ± SEM are shown.
TABLE 3 | Sleep parameters.
Sleep stage Intention
completed
Intention
reinstated
Intention active
throughout
Sleep time 447.81 ± 8.03 446.43 ± 10.69 439.33 ± 8.60
W 6.94 ± 1.50 8.60 ± 3.07 13.37 ± 2.60
S1 19.69 ± 2.61 20.85 ± 2.45 27.87 ± 4.12
S2 233.89 ± 6.20 240.30 ± 8.75 237.70 ± 8.69
SWS 79.50 ± 6.71 76.93 ± 5.84 72.03 ± 7.60
REM 104.56 ± 4.16 108.30 ± 6.19 101.03 ± 6.09
Sleep time (total sleep time), W (wake), S1 (sleep stage 1), S2 (sleep stage 2), SWS
(slow wave sleep, i.e., the sum of sleep in stages 3 and 4 sleep) and REM (rapid
eye movement sleep) in minutes. Means ± SEM are shown.
EXPERIMENT 2: INTENTION
REINSTATED
Experiment 1 showed that sleep no longer facilitates the ability
to execute an intended action after a delay of 2 days when the
intention has already been completed before the night of sleep
or wakefulness. In everyday life, however, completed intentions
can become relevant again. For example, a person might form
the intention to water the flowers in her flat. After completing
this intention, she might renew the intention to water the flowers
again 2 days later. This raises the question, whether it is possible
to reinstate a completed intention to make it sensitive for sleep-
dependent consolidation processes again. In Experiment 2, we
examined the effect of sleep on intentions that were completed
and then reinstated before sleep or wakefulness.
Subjects performed on the same task with the same instruction
as in Experiment 1, i.e., subjects completed the intention 2 h after
the initial intention formation. However, after the first test session
the intention was reinstated by instructing the subjects that they
would have to do the task again at a second test session 2 days
later (Figures 1C and 3). Following this instruction, one group of
subjects went to sleep (n = 15) whereas the other group stayed
awake (n = 14) the following night like in Experiment 1. We
hypothesized that the improving effect of sleep on prospective
memory performance would reappear with the intention being
reinstated before sleep. Specifically, sleep should again facilitate
the storage of the cue-intention associations, such that after
sleep, subjects would be expected to rely to a larger extent
on spontaneous retrieval and should be less impaired in cue
detection under divided attention compared to wake subjects.
Methods
Participants
A total of 29 healthy young adults (19 females, mean age [±SD]:
22.69 ± 2.98), were included in the analysis of Experiment
2. Criteria for subjects to participate in the study were as in
Experiment 1. In total, four sleep subjects and nine wake subjects
had to be excluded. Nine participants were excluded due to
problems with the protocol (three participants talked about the
experiment, three participants did not detect any of the cue words
in the first test session, one participant slept for 2.5 h during
the day after the experimental night, one participant got sick
during the experimental night, and one participant exceeded the
pre-defined body-mass-index cut-off of 25). Four outliers had to
be excluded due to very poor prospective memory performance
during the second test (more than 2 SD below the overall
mean). All subjects gave written informed consent and were paid
for participation. The study was approved by the local ethics
committee of the University Tübingen.
Design and Procedure
The experimental design and procedure was identical to
Experiment 1, with the only exception that after the first test
session in the evening, subjects were instructed, that they would
have to complete the task again 2 days later and that they would
have to keep this instruction in mind because the experimenter
would not remind them of what to do at the second test session
(Figure 1C).
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Prospective Memory Task
Tasks and materials were identical to Experiment 1 (intention
completed) except that subjects after the first test session were
instructed about the second test 2 days later (Figure 3). Although
subjects expected the second test by then, they were still
explicitly instructed before the second test session to detect the
cue words and to type in the associated words in the lexical
decision task, in order to ensure comparable conditions with
Experiment 1.
Control tasks and statistical analyses were as for Experiment 1.
Results
Prospective Memory Task Performance
Reinstating the intention after completion of the task before
sleep did not suffice for sleep to improve cue detection in the
prospective memory task. Subjects in the sleep group detected
94.00 ± 2.35% of the cue words without the secondary task
and 82.00 ± 4.60% with the secondary task to be performed
in parallel (z = −2.57, p = 0.01, d = 0.88). Wake subjects
detected 95.00 ± 1.74% and 86.43 ± 3.41% (z = −2.17,
p = 0.03, d = 0.88) of cue words without and with the secondary
task, respectively [main effect ‘with/without secondary task’:
F(1,27) = 16.51, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.38; main effect ‘sleep/wake’:
F(1,27) = 0.50, p = 0.49; ‘sleep/wake’ × ‘with/without secondary
task’ interaction: F(1,27) = 0.46, p = 0.50; Figure 2C]. Thus,
divided attention impaired cue detection in the sleep group to
the same extent as in the wake group, similar to Experiment
1, suggesting that reinstating the intention before sleep did not
make the intention subject to sleep-dependent consolidation
processes again.
Reinstating the completed intention also did not affect the
sleep benefit on the retrospective component of prospective
memory. Relative to the number of cues detected, sleep
subjects at the second test remembered 71.61 ± 4.42% of the
associated words and wake subjects remembered 74.56 ± 4.58%,
F(1,27) = 0.22, p = 0.65 (for main effect ‘sleep/wake,’
Supplementary Figure 1C), which was independent of attentional
resources available, F(1,27) = 0.01, p = 0.94 for the interaction
‘sleep/wake’ × ‘secondary task’ and F(1,27) = 0.16, p = 0.69 for
main effect ‘with/without secondary task.’
As in Experiment 1, learning performance of cue words and
associated words was comparable between groups. Subjects in the
sleep and wake group remembered 18.47± 0.17 and 18.71± 0.22
cue words in the criterion learning trial (U = 89.00, z = −0.78,
p = 0.45), and needed on average 2.53 ± 0.19 and 2.71 ± 0.30
trials to reach the criterion (U = 96.00, z = −0.39, p = 0.72).
Recall of associated words was 15.93 ± 0.71 and 17.00 ± 0.55
in the criterion learning trial, t(27) = −1.18, p = 0.25, with a
mean of 1.27 ± 0.12 and 1.36 ± 0.13 learning trials, U = 95.50,
z = −0.52, p = 0.70, in the sleep and wake group, respectively.
During the first completion of the task in the evening, subjects
were comparable in prospective memory task performance. Sleep
participants detected 82.33 ± 2.84% of cue words and wake
participants detected 85.36 ± 3.53% (U = 79.00, z = −1.16,
p= 0.26). Relative to the number of correctly detected cue words,
both groups were also comparable in the number of remembered
associated words [sleep: 67.58 ± 4.81%, wake: 75.50 ± 3.44%;
t(27)=−1.32, p= 0.20].
Ongoing Task Performance
Sleep and wake subjects did not differ in lexical decision
performance at learning, at the first test as well as at
the second test [Table 1; without the secondary task:
main effect ‘sleep/wake’ for reaction time F(1,27) = 2.13,
p = 0.16, for error rate F(1,27) = 0.33, p = 0.57, interaction
‘sleep/wake’ × ‘learning/test1/test2’ for reaction time
F(1.54,41.57)= 0.76, p= 0.44, for error rate F(1.50,40.49)= 0.07,
p = 0.89]. Like in Experiment 1, reaction times changed across
time, independent of sleep and wake conditions [main effect
‘learning/test1/test2’ F(1.54,41.57) = 6.08, p = 0.009, η2p = 0.18].
All subjects slowed down responses from the learning to the
first test session and accelerated their reaction time again
from the first to the second test session [learning vs. first test:
t(28) = −4.84, p < 0.001, d = 0.45; first test vs. second test:
t(28) = 2.35, p = 0.03, d = 0.34; learning vs. second test:
t(28) = −0.72, p = 0.48]. Error rates did not change over time
[main effect ‘learning/test1/test2’ F(1.50,40.49)= 1.12, p= 0.32].
Performing the secondary auditory attention task in
parallel during the second test session slowed down reaction
times for lexical decisions in both sleep subjects and wake
subjects [for main effect ‘with/without secondary task’:
F(1,27) = 76.28, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.74; for ‘sleep/wake’ main
effect: F(1,27) = 0.06, p = 0.80, for interaction ‘with/without
secondary task’ × ‘sleep/wake’: F(1,27) = 3.49, p = 0.07],
and increased error rates [for main effect ’with/without
secondary task’: F(1,27) = 31.07, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.54; for main
effect ‘sleep/wake’: F(1,27) = 0.49, p = 0.49, for interaction
‘with/without secondary task’ × ‘sleep/wake’: F(1,27) = 0.05,
p= 0.83].
Control Tasks
The final cue recognition test after the second test session
confirmed, like in Experiment 1, that sleep and wake participants
almost perfectly recognized all of the cue words (recognition
accuracy: sleep 99.00 ± 0.56%, wake 99.52 ± 0.21%, U = 98.00,
z = −0.38, p = 0.87). Memory for the associated words in
the cued recall was also comparable in the sleep and wake
group [sleep 72.33 ± 4.28%, wake 78.57 ± 3.69%, t(27) = 1.10,
p = 0.28]. Like in Experiment 1, sleep and wake subjects were
also comparable in performance on the vigilance task (reaction
times and error rates) as well as in reported sleepiness during
learning and both test sessions (for main effect ‘sleep/wake’ and
interaction ‘sleep/wake’ × ‘learning/test1/test2’: all p > 0.10,
Table 2), despite generally slower reaction times and higher
sleepiness ratings at the first test in the evening for all subjects
[for main effect ‘learning/test1/test2’: reaction time p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.29; sleepiness p = 0.003, η2p = 0.27; error rate p = 0.60].
Subjects in the sleep group also displayed normal sleep patterns
during the night following the first test session (Table 3).
Discussion
Experiment 2 examined the possibility to reinstate completed
intentions for a sleep-dependent improvement. Contrary to our
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hypothesis, a period of sleep following intention reinstatement
did not facilitate the ability to execute the intended action after
a delay of 2 days. Like in Experiment 1, participants in both the
sleep group and the wake group detected less cues in the ongoing
task when their attention was reduced by the secondary auditory
attention task, suggesting that both groups relied to a larger
extent on monitoring and sleep subjects were not able to recruit
on less resource-dependent spontaneous retrieval processes to
detect cue words.
This finding indicates that reinstating an intention after
its completion does not make the intentional memory trace
gain access to sleep-dependent memory processing. Instructing
participants to do the task again 2 days later, with this instruction
being provided only after having completed the task, does
not seem to be sufficient to reinstate the intention for the
enhancing effects of sleep. One possible explanation for this
failure is that the reinstatement took place too long after
the original learning experience. The execution of intentions
has been suggested to depend on a link formed between the
intention and the context in which the intention is expected
to be executed (Marsh et al., 2006), with this context effect
being most evident when the intention-context link is formed
during initial encoding of the intention (Nowinski and Dismukes,
2005). Similarly, Scullin and McDaniel (2010) observed a sleep
effect on prospective memory only in the context, i.e., the
ongoing task, which was temporally paired with the prospective
memory instruction during the learning session. Scullin and
McDaniel (2010) argued that the intention-context association is
strengthened by consolidation processes during sleep, which then
facilitates subsequent spontaneous retrieval processes. Based on
this evidence, it can be speculated that in the present paradigm
the intention must be formed in close proximity to the initial
learning session in order for sleep to strengthen the memory
representations of the cue-associate relations.
EXPERIMENT 3: INTENTION ACTIVE
THROUGHOUT
Experiments 1 and 2 established that (i) sleep no longer benefits
the execution of intentions when these intentions are already
completed before sleep, and (ii) instructing subjects for the
second test session after completion of the intention in the
first test session is not sufficient to reinstate the sleep benefit.
Importantly, in Experiments 1 and 2, the prospective memory
instruction given after the learning session was only directed
at the first test session 2 h after learning, but this instruction
never included the second test session 2 days later. In Experiment
2, the reinstatement of the intention took place after the first
test session, that is, about 2 h after the end of the initial
learning session and the initial prospective memory instruction.
Considering that sleep might act to strengthen the intentional
cue-associate connection that is formed in the learning context,
2 h of time difference between the reinstatement of the intention
and the initial encoding of the cue-associates might have been
too long in order to link the renewed intention to the previously
learned cue-associate word pairs. Accordingly, in Experiment 3
we tested whether completed intentions benefit from sleep if
the subjects are instructed about both test sessions (the first one
after 2 h and the second one after 2 days) immediately after the
learning session, such that the intention for the second delayed
test is formed in temporal proximity to the cue-associate learning
context and is active throughout the entire experimental period.
The same task and setup was used as in Experiments 1 and
2. However, after the learning session, subjects were instructed
that they would have to do the task 2 days later, with this
delayed test session being introduced as the main part of the
experiment. In addition, subjects were told that they would have
to complete the task once already in 2 h, for practice purposes.
After the first test session, the instruction for the second test
session was repeated to keep the procedure comparable with
Experiment 2 (Figure 1D). After this instruction, one group of
subjects went to sleep (n = 15) whereas the other stayed awake
the following night (n= 17). We expected that with the intention
active across the entire retention interval and the intention being
formed in close proximity to the initial learning, sleep would
strengthen the intentional association between the cues and the
associated actions. Therefore, we hypothesized that after sleep,
subjects would rely to a larger extent on spontaneous retrieval and
would be less impaired in cue detection under divided attention
conditions compared to wake subjects.
Methods
Participants
A total of 32 healthy young adults (16 females, mean age [±SD]:
22.91 ± 2.72) were included in the analysis of Experiment 3.
Inclusion and exclusion criteria were identical to Experiments 1
and 2. Overall 4 participants of the sleep group and 2 participants
from the wake group had to be excluded. One participant showed
pathological sleep with a REM sleep-onset latency of 5.5 min and
one participant slept for 2 h during the day after the experimental
night. Four outliers had to be excluded due to poor prospective
memory performance during the second test session (more than
2 SD below the overall mean). All subjects gave written informed
consent and were paid for participation. The study was approved
by the local ethics committee of the University Tübingen.
Design and Procedure
The experimental design and procedure were identical to
Experiment 1, with the only exception that this time, immediately
after the learning session, subjects were instructed that there
would be two test sessions during which they would have to
complete the instructed intention (Figure 1D).
Prospective Memory Task
Tasks and materials were identical to Experiments 1 and 2, except
that subjects after the learning session were instructed about both
test sessions (Figure 3). With this instruction, they were told that
they would have to detect the cue words and type in the associated
words at the test session in 2 days and for practice purposes
also in 2 h before the night of sleep or wakefulness. They were
instructed that for both test sessions they would have to keep this
instruction in mind because the experimenter would not remind
them of what to do. Although subjects expected the second test,
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 January 2017 | Volume 7 | Article 2025
fpsyg-07-02025 December 31, 2016 Time: 14:1 # 11
Barner et al. Sleep and Prospective Memory
they were still explicitly instructed before the second test session
to detect the cue words and type in the associated words in the
lexical decision task, in order to ensure comparable conditions
with Experiments 1 and 2.
Control Tasks
Control tasks were identical to Experiments 1 and 2. Because
vigilance data were missing for one subject in the wake group,
the available sample size was n = 15 (sleep group) and n = 16
(wake group) for the analyses of the vigilance task. For the final
cue recognition test and the cued recall of the associated words,
data of one subject in the sleep group was missing, thus analyses
included n = 14 participants in the sleep group and n = 17
participants in the wake group for these data.
Statistical analyses were as in Experiments 1 and 2.
Results
Prospective Memory Task Performance
As expected, with the intention instructed immediately after the
learning session, sleep improved the detection of cued words
in the lexical decision task under divided attention conditions.
Subjects in the sleep group detected 88.67 ± 3.36% of cue words
without the secondary task and 88.00± 3.27% with the secondary
task to be performed in parallel (z = −0.38, p = 1). Wake
subjects, on the other hand differed in cue detection when they
had to perform the secondary task in parallel. They detected
95.88 ± 1.93% of cues without and 87.06 ± 2.68% with the
secondary task [z=−2.28, p= 0.02; ‘sleep/wake’× ‘with/without
secondary task’ interaction: F(1,30) = 4.58, p = 0.04, η2p = 0.13;
main effect ‘sleep/wake’: F(1,30) = 0.81, p = 0.38; main effect
‘with/without secondary task’: F(1,30)= 6.21, p= 0.02, η2p= 0.17;
Figure 2D].
Although descriptively on a higher level, the retrospective
component of prospective memory was not significantly
improved by the sleep manipulation. Relative to the number
of cues detected, sleep subjects at the second test remembered
71.01 ± 3.97% of the associated words and wake subjects
remembered 66.55 ± 3.73%, F(1,30) = 0.67, p = 0.42 (for
main effect ‘sleep/wake,’ Figure 1D), which was independent
of attentional resources available, [F(1,30) = 2.54, p = 0.12
for the interaction ‘sleep/wake’ × ‘secondary task’ and
F(1,30) = 0.02, p = 0.90 for the main effect ‘with/without
secondary task’).
As in Experiments 1 and 2, learning performance of cue words
and associated words was comparable between groups. Subjects
in the sleep and wake group remembered 19.00 ± 0.22 and
18.59± 0.21 cue words in the criterion learning trial (U = 92.00,
z = −1.44, p = 0.175), and needed on average 2.33 ± 0.19
and 2.71 ± 0.29 trials to reach the criterion (U = 105.00,
z=−0.96, p= 0.35). Recall of associated words was 15.73± 0.67
and 15.00 ± 0.66 in the criterion learning trial (U = 104.00,
z = −0.90, p = 0.38) with a mean of 1.27 ± 0.12 and 1.35 ± 0.12
learning trials (U = 116.50, z = −0.52, p = 0.71) in the
sleep and wake group, respectively. During the first completion
of the task in the evening, sleep and wake participants did
not differ in prospective memory performance. Sleep subjects
detected 84.00 ± 3.69% of cue words and wake subjects detected
87.65 ± 4.87% (U = 96.00, z = −1.22, p = 0.23). Relative to the
number of correctly detected cue words, sleep and wake subjects
remembered 68.82 ± 3.69% and 68.25 ± 3.83% of the associates,
t(30)= 0.11, p= 0.92.
Ongoing Task Performance
In the lexical decision task, subjects in the sleep group showed
overall faster reaction times than the wake group [Table 1; main
effect ‘sleep/wake’: F(1,30) = 6.94, p = 0.01, η2p = 0.19], which
was consistent across learning and both test sessions [interaction
‘learning/test1/test2’ × ‘sleep/wake’: F(2,60) = 0.89, p = 0.42].
Additionally, independent of sleep and wake conditions, subjects
slowed down in their reaction time from the learning to the
first test session [t(31) = −3.48, p < 0.01] and showed faster
reaction times again from the first to the second test session
(z = −2.67, p < 0.01), while the learning session and the second
test session did not differ [z = −0.69, p = 50; main effect
‘learning/test1/test2’: F(2,60) = 6.59, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.18].
Error rates in the lexical decision task did not differ between
groups [for main effect ‘sleep/wake’: F(1,30) = 1.26, p = 0.27;
for main effect ‘learning/test1/test2’: F(1.39,41.80) = 1.08,
p = 0.33; for interaction ‘sleep/wake’ × ‘learning/test1/test2’:
F(1.39,41.80)= 0.26, p= 0.69].
Performing the secondary auditory attention task in parallel
during the second test session slowed down reaction times for
lexical decisions in both sleep subjects and wake subjects [for
main effect ‘with/without secondary task’: F(1,30) = 182.12,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.86; for interaction ‘with/without secondary
task’ × ‘sleep/wake’: F(1,30) = 0.07, p = 0.79], again with
sleep subjects overall responding faster [main effect ‘sleep/wake’:
F(1,30) = 4.90, p = 0.04, η2p = 0.14]. Divided attention by
the secondary task also increased the error rates in the sleep
group as well as in the wake group [for main effect ‘with/without
secondary task’: F(1,30) = 8.03, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.21, for main
effect ‘sleep/wake’: F(1,30) = 0.12, p = 0.74, for interaction
‘with/without secondary task’ × ‘sleep/wake’: F(1,30) = 3.31,
p= 0.08].
Control Tasks
Like in Experiments 1 and 2, the final cue recognition test at the
second test session confirmed that sleep and wake participants
almost perfectly remembered all of the cue words (recognition
accuracy: sleep 99.81 ± 0.41%, wake 99.41 ± 0.20%, U = 95.50,
z = −1.07, p = 0.32). Sleep and wake participants were
also comparable in final cued recall of the associated words
[sleep 73.21 ± 3.65%, wake 70.29 ± 3.22%, t(29) = −0.60,
p = 0.55]. Likewise, sleep and wake subjects did not differ
in their performance in the vigilance task (for reaction time
and error rate: main effects ‘sleep/wake’ and interactions
‘sleep/wake’ × ‘learning/test1/test2’ p > 0.30, Table 2), despite
generally slower reaction times for all subjects at the first
test session in the evening, like in Experiments 1 and 2
(main effect ‘learning/test1/test2’: for reaction time p = 0.03,
η2p = 0.21; for error rate p = 0.61). The sleep and wake
groups differed in subjective sleepiness at the first test session
(U = 72.00, z = −2.19, p = 0.03) and the second test
session (U = 52.00, z = −3.11, p < 0.01), with the sleep
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participants being more sleepy at test 1 (sleep: 4.07 ± 0.24,
wake: 3.29 ± 0.23) and less sleepy at test 2 (sleep: 1.93 ± 0.23,
wake: 3.00± 0.21). Sleepiness levels at learning were comparable
between groups [U = 125.50, z = −0.09, p = 0.93; interaction:
‘learning/test1/test2’ × ‘sleep/wake’: F(2,60) = 12.68, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.30; main effect: ‘learning/test1/test2’: F(2,60) = 28.14,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.48; main effect: ‘sleep/wake’: F(1,30) = 0.12,
p = 0.74]. Finally, subjects in the sleep group displayed normal
sleep patterns during the night following prospective memory
instructions (Table 3).
Discussion
In accordance with our hypothesis, Experiment 3 showed that
sleep benefits the ability to execute an intention that has
been completed once before sleep, when subjects are instructed
about the delayed prospective memory test immediately after
the initial learning session. Thus, sleep facilitates the delayed
execution of the intention if the intention is formed in
close temporal proximity to the learning of the cue-associates
and if subjects know from the beginning that they have to
execute the intention again 2 days later. In this case, relative
to performance under full attention, sleep subjects were not
impaired in cue detection under divided attention conditions.
Wake subjects, on the other hand, differed in performance
under divided attention and full attention, with a relatively
lower performance when the attention was reduced. This pattern
of results suggests that sleep subjects were able to rely to
a larger extent on spontaneous retrieval processes to detect
the cues, while wake subjects depended more on attention-
based monitoring strategies. With the intention being formed
in close proximity to the learning session, sleep presumably
strengthened the link between the intention and the cue-
associate representations in the memory network allowing for an
automatic activation of the intention upon encountering the cue
words.
The finding that wake participants generally showed slower
reaction times in the lexical decision task was unexpected.
Importantly, this difference was evident across all sessions, i.e.,
wake subjects already performed slower during the learning
session and the first test session in the evening, excluding the
possibility that slower reaction times were due to the wakefulness
manipulation. Sleepiness is unlikely to explain the differences
in lexical decision reaction times because wake subjects showed
slower reaction times throughout all sessions but only displayed
lower sleepiness than the sleep group at the first test session and
higher sleepiness at the second test session. Moreover, sleepiness
was not significantly correlated with reaction times in the lexical
decision task, neither at test 1 (sleep: r = 0.43, p = 0.11,
wake: r = −0.30, p = 0.25) nor at test 2 (sleep: full attention,
r = 0.03, p = 0.91, divided attention, r = −0.15, p = 0.61;
wake: full attention, r = 0.07, p = 0.79, divided attention,
r = 0.15, p = 0.58). Importantly, sleepiness at the second test
session did also not significantly correlate with the number of
cues detected under full attention (sleep: r = −0.50, p = 0.06,
wake: r = 0.21, p = 0.42) as well as under divided attention
(sleep: r = −0.40, p = 0.15, wake: r = 0.25, p = 0.33). Finally,
reaction times in the lexical decision task were not associated
with the number of cues detected at test 1 (sleep: r = −0.04,
p = 0.90, wake: r = 0.09, p = 0.73) and at test 2 (sleep: full
attention, r= 0.32, p= 0.24, divided attention: r= 0.48, p= 0.07;
wake: full attention, r = 0.43, p = 0.09, divided attention,
r=−0.17 p= 0.52), indicating that sleepiness and reaction times
in the lexical decision task did not affect the number of cues
detected.
On a descriptive level, wake subjects in Experiment 3 overall
performed very well in cue detection, such that in the full
attention condition their performance was above the average
of around 90%, and in the divided attention condition they
performed on a level comparable with the sleep participants.
Although this difference was not significant (all p > 0.07), it is
in contrast to our Basic experiment (Diekelmann et al., 2013a)
where under divided attention wake participants performed
significantly worse than sleep participants. It could be speculated
that this high performance level in wake subjects was due to
subjectively higher sleepiness in these participants, which might
have led to overcompensation with regard to the detection
of the cue words, with wake subjects focusing all available
attentional resources on the prospective memory task. However,
subjective sleepiness was not correlated with the number of cues
detected, speaking against this possibility. Moreover, objective
alertness levels as measured by reaction times and error rates
in the vigilance task were not different in wake subjects
compared to sleep participants. Vigilance task performance
was also not correlated with cue detection in the prospective
memory task (all p > 0.05), speaking against the possibility
that prospective memory performance was affected by general
alertness levels. Alternatively, higher overall performance in
wake participants might be interpreted in light of recent
findings showing that sleep deprivation can be a state of
heightened plasticity due to prefrontal disinhibition (Sprenger
et al., 2015). In the wake group, disinhibition under sleep
deprivation following the first test session might have triggered
plastic changes during subsequent recovery sleep, leading to
overall higher performance levels at the second test 2 days
later.
CROSS-EXPERIMENT COMPARISONS
For a post hoc comparison of cue detection across all four
experiments, an ANOVA with the between-subjects factors
‘experiment’ [Basic experiment/Experiment 1 (Intention
completed)/Experiment II (Intention reinstated)/Experiment III
(Intention active throughout)] and ‘sleep/wake’ and the within-
subject factor ‘with/without secondary task’ was conducted. This
overall comparison confirmed that cue detection for sleep and
wake participants differed depending on the instructed intention
and on whether participants had to perform the prospective
memory task under full attention or divided attention conditions
[interaction ‘experiment’ × ‘sleep/wake’ × ‘with/without
secondary task’: F(3,112)= 3.65, p= 0.02, η2p = 0.09].
When analyzing all sleep groups separately, the beneficial
effect of sleep on cue detection differed across experiments
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[interaction ‘experiment’ × ‘with/without secondary task’:
F(3,61) = 2.60, p = 0.06, η2p = 0.11; main effect ‘experiment’:
p = 0.80, main effect ‘with/without secondary task’: p < 0.01]:
the sleep effect, as reflected in comparable cue detection
under full attention and divided attention, was evident only
when the intention was induced together with the previous
encoding of cue-associates and when the intention was active
throughout the entire retention period (comparison of the
Basic experiment and Experiment 3: p > 0.70 for interaction
‘experiment’ × ‘with/without secondary task’ and main effect
‘with/without secondary task’). No such sleep effect was
evident when participants completed the intention before
sleep and when the intention was simply reinstated after
completion, as reflected in decreased cue detection when
participants performed the task under divided attention
compared to full attention [comparison of Experiment 1 and
Experiment 2: F(1,31) = 17.33, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.36, for
main effect ‘with/without secondary task,’ F(1,31) = 0.03,
p = 0.87, for interaction ‘experiment’× ‘with/without secondary
task’]. Comparing the sleep groups of the intention active
throughout experiment (Experiment 3, sleep effect) with the
sleep groups of the intention completed and the intention
reinstated experiments (Experiments 1 and 2, no sleep
effect), confirmed a significantly better cue detection under
divided attention with the intention active throughout the
retention period [interaction ‘experiment’ × ‘with/without
secondary task’: F(1,31) = 4.88, p = 0.04, η2p = 0.14
for Experiment 3 vs. Experiment 1, and F(1,28) = 7.63,
p = 0.01, η2p = 0.21 for Experiment 3 vs. Experiment
2]. Similarly, the sleep groups of the Basic experiment
tended to perform better in cue detection under divided
attention than the sleep groups of the intention completed
and the intention reinstated experiments [interaction
‘experiment’ × ‘with/without secondary task’: F(1,33) = 2.65,
p = 0.11, η2p = 0.07 for Basic experiment vs. Experiment 1, and
F(1,30) = 3.25, p = 0.08, η2p = 0.10 for Basic experiment vs.
Experiment 2].
Separate analyses of all wake groups across the four
experiments showed a decrease in cue detection under
divided attention compared to full attention in all experiments
(comparison across all experiments and when comparing single
experiments with each other: all p < 0.005 for main effects
‘with/without secondary task,’ all p > 0.11 for interaction
effects ‘experiment’ × ‘with/without secondary task’). Overall
performance in cue detection also differed across experiments
(p = 0.03 for main effect ‘experiment’), with post hoc tests,
comparing the single experiments, showing that wake subjects
in Experiment 3 performed better than in the Basic experiment
and in Experiment 1 (p = 0.01 and p = 0.04) and wake
subjects in Experiment 2 performed better than in the Basic
experiment and in Experiment 1 (p= 0.03 and p= 0.09; all other
p> 0.70).
Despite these differences between experiments in the
wake groups, the cross-experiment comparisons are in line
with the reported findings of the single experiments and
confirm the beneficial effect of sleep for intentions selectively
and only when the intention is active during sleep and
when it is induced in temporal proximity to the learning
session.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Based on the previous finding from our Basic experiment that
sleep benefits prospective memory (Diekelmann et al., 2013a),
here we investigated in three experiments, whether this beneficial
effect of sleep depends on the relevance of prospective memories
for actions to be performed in the future. Particularly, we asked
whether the sleep effect is abolished when the intended action
is completed before sleep and whether an intention can be
reinstated for a sleep benefit after its completion. We show in
Experiment 1 that once an intention is completed before sleep,
the subsequent execution of prospective memory is no longer
facilitated by a night of sleep. In Experiment 2, we found that
contrary to our hypothesis, reinstructing the intention after its
completion is not sufficient to reinstate the intention for a sleep
benefit. Experiment 3 finally demonstrates that sleep improves
intention execution if the intention for both test sessions is
formed in temporal proximity to the initial learning session and
thus, subjects expect right from the start to be tested on the
prospective memory task again after its first completion.
These findings are in line with previous evidence indicating
that sleep-dependent memory consolidation is selective in the
way that it particularly fosters memories that are relevant
for future behavior. Sleep has been shown to favor the
consolidation of memories that are expected to be rewarded at
testing as compared with memories for which reward was not
expected (Fischer and Born, 2009). Likewise, emotionally charged
memories benefit to a larger extent from sleep than neutral
memories (Payne et al., 2008, 2012; Payne and Kensinger, 2010,
2011), and sleep selectively consolidates memories for which
subjects expect to be tested after sleep, whereas memories that
are not expected to be tested do not benefit from sleep (Wilhelm
et al., 2011; Van Dongen et al., 2012). In accord with this evidence,
Experiment 1 demonstrates for the first time that completing an
intention before sleep abolishes the previously shown beneficial
effect of sleep on the subsequent execution of the intention. These
findings are reminiscent of the Zeigarnik effect in suggesting that
sleep improves prospective memories only as long as they still
have to be executed in the future, i.e., as long as they are relevant
for future behavior, with sleep’s supportive effect vanishing
once the intention has been completed. They corroborate the
concept of prospective memory as a fundamentally dynamic type
of memory existing only in the presence of specific (driving)
intentions.
Based on our Basic experiment (Diekelmann et al., 2013a)
we suggest that sleep improves prospective remembering by
strengthening the association between the prospective memory
cue and the associated intended action, thereby favoring
spontaneous associative retrieval processes upon encountering
the prospective memory cue after sleep (McDaniel et al.,
2004; Scullin and McDaniel, 2010; Diekelmann et al., 2013a).
Experiment 1 indicates that this proposed strengthening of
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the cue-action association is dependent on the intention being
active across the sleep period. Considering the results of our
Basic experiment (Diekelmann et al., 2013a), it could be argued
that sleep did not specifically improve the intentional aspect of
prospective memory but rather non-specifically strengthened the
associations encoded prior to sleep, thereby indirectly facilitating
spontaneous retrieval of the intention as a by-product of ‘simple’
retrospective associative memory consolidation. However, if
this was true, we would have expected a beneficial effect of
sleep also for completed intentions, considering that the cue-
associates were encoded similarly prior to sleep with and
without completion of the intention. The finding that, despite
similar retrospective memory encoding, sleep did not benefit
completed intentions suggests that – similar to the Zeigarnik
effect – the effect of sleep for prospective memory critically
depends on the intention being active across sleep, i.e., the
intention being relevant for the successful execution of future
actions.
There are different possible explanations for the abolished
sleep effect after intention completion. Zeigarnik attributed better
memory for uncompleted intentions on the ‘tension’ that is
generated when a task is interrupted or not yet completed
(Zeigarnik, 1927). According to this assumption, uncompleted
intentions in the present study might have existed in a state of
increased tension, with this tension possibly signaling importance
of the memory, similar to an emotional charge, which then
leads to a preferential access to sleep-dependent memory
consolidation. With the intention completed before sleep, the
tension might be released and, with it, the relevance signal for
consolidation during sleep.
More contemporary theories suggest that intentions that
are to be executed in the future show a privileged status of
heightened activation over information that is simply to be
remembered (Goschke and Kuhl, 1993; Marsh et al., 1998),
an effect known as the ‘intention superiority effect’. In this
vein, uncompleted intentions that are still to be executed might
show heightened activation making these intentions relevant and
susceptible to sleep-dependent consolidation, whereas reduced
or abolished activation after intention completion might in turn
reduce their sensitivity to consolidation processes during sleep.
It has been shown that finished intentions no longer elicit
longer reaction times when cues are presented again, whereas
cues of suspended intentions that are still relevant for later
execution elicit slower responses (Scullin et al., 2009, 2011).
Likewise, subjects can more efficiently deactivate intentions and
thereby avoid commission errors when the intention is completed
than when it is not yet completed (Bugg and Scullin, 2013).
However, the exact mechanisms of this process, e.g., whether
the heightened activation of intentions passively fades after their
completion or whether completed intentions become actively
inhibited, are not yet fully understood (see for example Bugg
et al., 2013; Pink and Dodson, 2013; Scullin and Bugg, 2013;
Walser et al., 2013).
An alternative explanation is based on the idea that the
intentional memory does not only comprise the cue-action
association but additionally includes a link to a (separate)
intention representation that together with the cue-action
association forms an intentional memory network. The intention
representation, by signaling future relevance, might tag the cue-
action association for consolidation processes during sleep. In
order for the intentional network to be efficiently established,
the intention representation might have to be encoded together
with the cue-action association in order to tag this association
for subsequent consolidation. This idea is in line with evidence
suggesting that a link formed between the intention and the
context in which the intention has to be executed determines
subsequent prospective memory performance in that same
context (Nowinski and Dismukes, 2005; Marsh et al., 2006).
Moreover, it has been shown that sleep particularly facilitates
intention execution in the context that was temporally paired
with the encoding of the intention (Scullin and McDaniel, 2010).
Thus, in Experiment 1, the initial encoding of the cue-action
associations might have been specifically linked to the expected
execution of the intention at the first retest 2 h later, with this
link therefore not being subject to subsequent sleep-dependent
consolidation processes.
The findings of Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 are in
line with this latter explanation. Experiment 2 shows that it
is not possible to reinstate a completed intention for sleep-
dependent consolidation simply by announcing, after completion
of the intention, that subjects would have to execute the task
again 2 days later. While a renewed tension according to
the Zeigarnik effect as well as a renewed activation according
to the ‘intention superiority effect’ could be expected to be
achieved relatively easy with a reinstruction of the intention,
it might be hard or even impossible to connect the intention
to the original cue-action associations after the completion of
the intention. With the reinstruction of the intention taking
place about 2 h after the initial encoding of the cue-action
associations, the reinstructed intention representation might not
be effectively connected to the cue-action associations, thus
failing to tag these associations for consolidation processes during
sleep. Experiment 3 shows that the sleep effect reappears when
subjects are instructed right after the initial learning of the cue-
action associations that they would be tested on their prospective
memory twice. This finding suggests that the temporal proximity
between intention formation and encoding of the cue-action
associations is a key factor for the sleep benefit to emerge,
which is in line with evidence from Scullin and McDaniel
(2010) showing that intentions benefit from sleep particularly
when they are temporally paired with the context in which
they have to be executed later on, but not when there is a
temporal gap between the intention instruction and the context
encounter.
On a neurophysiological level, it can be speculated that
the intention instruction given shortly after initial learning,
i.e., in the learning context, recruits neuronal plastic processes
that are initiated during encoding, such that the cue-action
associations can be tagged by the intention for further processing
during sleep. There is ample evidence that newly encoded
retrospective memories become reactivated during periods of
subsequent sleep (for review, see Abel et al., 2013; Rasch and
Born, 2013). Neuronal network activity that is evident during
the encoding of new experiences is re-expressed (‘replayed’) in
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a similar way during sleep following the learning experience
(Wilson and McNaughton, 1994; Nádasdy et al., 1999; Ji and
Wilson, 2007). Such replay events are assumed to strengthen
the underlying neuronal connections and have mainly been
observed during SWS. A recent study found sleep-dependent
improvements of prospective memory specifically after SWS-rich
sleep periods (Diekelmann et al., 2013b), suggesting that similar
replay mechanisms might be involved in the reprocessing of
prospective memories during sleep. In the wake state, successful
prospective memory has been shown to rely mainly on activations
in prefrontal cortical areas (Burgess et al., 2003, 2007), and
there is evidence that sleep-associated memory reactivation
extends from hippocampal to cortical areas including prefrontal
cortex (Euston et al., 2007; Peyrache et al., 2009; Igloi et al.,
2015). Reactivations in prefrontal areas during sleep might
be specifically linked to intentional memory networks to
support prospective memory and planning (Buhry et al., 2011;
Schwindel and McNaughton, 2011). In the present study, the
intention instruction given shortly after the initial learning
experience might have tagged the newly encoded intentional
memory networks for subsequent reactivation during sleep, and
presumably during SWS, to strengthen the intentional cue-
action associations. The execution of the intention during the
expected completion of the task, on the other hand, might not
(or to a lesser extent) induce the plastic processes on which a
reinstatement of the intention/tag could build. With no (or a
weaker) reinstatement of the intention, the intentional memory
network might not be tagged for subsequent replay during
sleep, or alternatively, the replay might not be strong enough to
induce sufficient strengthening of the underlying connections.
Future studies should scrutinize potential neurophysiological
mechanisms of intention formation and intention reinstatement
systematically.
Importantly, Experiment 3 excludes the possibility that
the mere execution of the task before sleep abolishes the
sleep effect. The fact that Experiment 3 shows a beneficial
effect of sleep on prospective remembering despite prior task
execution strongly argues against the possibility that simply
performing on the task before sleep explains the lacking
sleep effect in Experiment 2. In showing a beneficial sleep
effect on prospective memory, Experiment 3 also replicates
and extends findings from our Basic experiment (Diekelmann
et al., 2013a) using an identical relatively complex prospective
memory task including 20 different cue words. Together with
earlier findings reporting sleep benefits for a simple one-item
prospective memory task in a more real world-like setting
(Diekelmann et al., 2013b) and a more typical laboratory
prospective memory task using two cue words (Scullin and
McDaniel, 2010), there is now convincing evidence that sleep
facilitates prospective remembering in a range of different tasks
and settings.
Overall performance levels of cue detection were higher in
the experiments of the present study compared to our Basic
experiment (Diekelmann et al., 2013a), with this effect being most
pronounced in the wake groups. The overall higher performance
levels can be explained by the additional test session before sleep
introduced in all three experiments. Detecting the cue words
and remembering the associates during the first test session
before sleep might have served as an additional practice of the
cue-associate pairs. The observation that overall cue detection
further increased across experiments in the wake groups could
be explained by the increasing number of intention instructions
and execution of the task. Previous evidence indicates that the
perceived importance of the prospective memory task affects
cue detection performance, with higher importance typically
leading to better cue detection (McDaniel and Einstein, 2000;
Walter and Meier, 2014, 2016). Considering that in the present
study, additional (re-)instructions were introduced in each of
the successive experiments, this might have inadvertently added
further importance to the prospective memory task, increasing
relevance in the intentional memory network. We can only
speculate why this increase in overall cue detection across
experiments was more pronounced in wake subjects. Sleep
possibly supports different mechanisms of prospective memory
performance, such as memory consolidation and reactivation,
which might ‘overwrite’ processes otherwise affecting prospective
memory performance in the wake state, such as additional
practice and repeated intention instructions. By strengthening
the intentional memory connections, we assume that sleep
favors spontaneous-associative retrieval processes (Diekelmann
et al., 2013a), whereas wake participants rely to a larger extent
on monitoring strategies, with the latter possibly being more
susceptible to the manipulation of task importance (McDaniel
and Einstein, 2000). Future studies should directly test these
ideas.
While the generally enhanced performance level might have
been still sufficient to yield a sleep benefit for the prospective
component of prospective memory, i.e., cue detection, the
intentional memories might have been too strong for a sleep
benefit on the retrospective component to occur. At first glance,
this is surprising considering that a successful sleep effect on
prospective memory could be expected to entail a benefit for
both the prospective component to detect the cue words and
the retrospective component to remember the associated words,
as was evident in our Basic experiment (Diekelmann et al.,
2013a). However, even though subjects did not receive any
feedback on their performance during the first test session,
there is evidence that memory retrieval per se can strengthen
retrospective memories (Roediger and Karpicke, 2006; Karpicke
and Roediger, 2008; Smith et al., 2013). Moreover, it has been
suggested that sleep benefits retrospective memory optimally
when memories are encoded with medium strength, whereas
memories that are too strong or too weak do not benefit from
sleep (Stickgold, 2009; Wilhelm et al., 2012). Thus, stronger
cue-action associations following the first prospective memory
test in the evening before sleep might have hindered the
emergence of an improving effect of sleep on the retrospective
component. Additionally, the retrospective component was not
affected by divided attention in any of the experiments –
other than the prospective component, which was impaired
under divided attention conditions. This pattern of results
replicates the findings from our Basic experiment (Diekelmann
et al., 2013a) and is in line with evidence indicating that
retrospective memory recall is less dependent on attentional
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resources (Craik et al., 1996; Iidaka et al., 2000), particularly with
the retrospective component (word recall) and the secondary task
(digit monitoring) relying on different processing systems in our
paradigm (i.e., verbal vs. numerical) (Fernandes and Guild, 2009;
Skinner et al., 2009).
Altogether, our four experiments show that prospective
memory benefits from a night of sleep only if the intention
is active throughout the entire experimental period, suggesting
that sleep facilitates prospective memory only as long as the
intention is relevant for future actions and if the intention is
formed in close proximity to the initial learning session. The sleep
effect on prospective memory is abolished once the intention has
been completed before sleep and cannot be reinstated by simply
reinstructing the intention after its completion. Future studies
will have to examine the neuronal mechanisms underlying these
effects, including the potential role of different sleep stages and
sleep parameters.
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